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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue of the pour
over order of the Utah Supreme Court and may have had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Appellant asserts the following issues on appeal:
a.

Issue: Whether the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient to support
the legal conclusion that Appellant "resided in the same residence" as
Appellee, and, thus, a "cohabitant" under the Cohabitant Abuse Act.
Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 et seq. (Cohabitant Abuse
Act); Utah R. Civ. P. 52.
Standard of review: Whether the trial court's findings of fact are sufficient
to support its decision is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard:
"[T]he court must set forth the reasons for its decision in enough detail for
the reviewing court to determine whether they are clearly erroneous."
Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App 31 f 9, 973 P2d 445, 448 {affd 2000 UT
56).

b.

Issue: Whether there was sufficient evidence to support factual findings to
support a conclusion that Appellant resided in the same residence as
Appellee and was, therefore, a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act.

Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 etseq. (Cohabitant Abuse
Act); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a);
Standard of review: Whether the findings of fact are supported by the
evidence is reviewed under the clear error standard. Findings will be
upheld unless the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or the
appellate court reaches "a firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
ProMaxDev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App.1997). The
party asserting the lack of evidentiary support must marshal the evidence
supporting the finding and demonstrate that it is insufficient. Id; Pasker,
Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994).
c.

Issue: Whether, under the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the trial court was correct
in its legal conclusion that Appellant "resided in the same residence" as
Appellee.
Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 et seq.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court correctly interpreted the
statutory language in reaching its legal conclusion is a question of law,
which is reviewed on appeal for correctness. Cox v. Krammer, 2003 UT
App264,76P.3dl84.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. $ 30-6-1 fSupp. 2003)
As used in this chapter:
(1)"Abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to
cause a cohabitant physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing a
cohabitant in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm.
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 15-2-1
or a person who is 16 years of age or older who:
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party;
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party;
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party;
(d) has one or more children in common with the other party;
(e) is the biological parent of the other party's unborn child; or
(f) resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party.
(Remainder of text is set forth in Appendix "A.")
Utah Code Ann. $ 30-6-2 (Supp. 2003)
(1) Any cohabitant who has been subjected to abuse or domestic violence,
or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of abuse or domestic violence,
may seek an ex parte protective order or a protective order in accordance
with this chapter, whether or not that person has left the residence or the
premises in an effort to avoid further abuse.
(2) A petition for a protective order may be filed under this chapter
regardless of whether an action for divorce between the parties is pending.
(3) A petition seeking a protective order may not be withdrawn without
approval of the court.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case.
This is an appeal from the issuance of a protective order by the Eighth Judicial
District Court in and for Daggett County, Manila Department, State of Utah. The trial
court was asked to decide, inter alia, whether Appellant, who is a resident of Mountain
View, Wyoming, resided in the same residence as Appellee, who resided in Manila, Utah.
Course of proceedings
On June 4, 2003, the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Daggett County,
Manila Department, State of Utah, issued an ex parte Protective Order. The order
directed that it be served in Mountain View, Wyoming. By arrangement with counsel, the
Respondent came to Utah and presented himself to the Daggett County Sheriffs office
and was served. An evidentiary hearing was held on September 5, 2003.
Disposition at trial
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court announced its ruling from the
bench, finding that Appellant and Appellee resided in the same residence in Manila, Utah.
The trial court found that "domestic violence or abuse" had occurred and issued a
Protective Order under Utah's Cohabitant Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 et seq.
(sometimes referred to as the "Act").
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

The parties to this case are: (1) Appellant, Ashely J. Bonser, who was Respondent
4

below and is hereafter referred to as "Bonser" and (2) Appellee, Andrea N. Keene,
who was Petitioner below and is hereafter referred to as "Keene." Record on
Appeal p. 1 (hereafter "R.O.A.")
2.

Appellee Keene is a resident of Manilla, Utah. (R.O.A. p. 6.)

3.

On June 4, 2003, Keene swore out a petition for a protective order under the Act,
alleging that Keene and Bonser "have resided in the same residence." (R. O. A. 613.)

4.

Keene's petition alleged incidents of domestic violence happened on May 31, 2003
in Manilla, Utah. (R. O. A. 7-8.)

5.

Keene's petition on its face alleged that Appellant Bonser should be served with
the ex parte protective order in Mountain View Wyoming. (R.O.A. 13.) The£x
Parte Protective Order commands that it be served in Mountain View, Wyoming.
(R.O.A. 18.)

6.

On September 5, 2003, the Honorable John R. Anderson held a Protective Order
hearing at which the following facts were adduced.
a.

Bonser was born and raised in Mountain View, Wyoming. (Transcript p.
42,11. 9-24, p. 51,1.25)

b.

Prior to the events alleged, Bonser worked for a Wyoming Health and
Safety, later called BSI, out of Mountain View, Wyoming. (Transcript p. 6,
11. 1-9, p. 54,11. 3-7)

5

Bonser received his mail in Mountain View, Wyoming. (Transcript p. 57,1.
25, p. 58,11. 1-2)
Bonser expressly disa\ owed an> intentic n to t eside at ± Andrea Keene's
residence. (Transcript p. 57,11. 1-17).
Bonser kept his property in Mountain View, Wyoming. (Transcript p. 58
1

'0)

Respondent MIKI five witnesses testified 1li:it BonstT \YM\ hern :i resident of
Mountain View Wyoming since birth and had never resided in Manilla,
Utah. (Transcript p.42,1.7; p.43,1.9; p.47, J.,

r.^.

i. - p.49. „• ~

1

;

p.50 U 1 22; & .p.51. 1 23 •] ) 58 1 K • )
Bonser is an avid fisherman and frequently goes fishing on Flaming Gorge
Reservoir while "putting in" out of Manilla, Utah. (Transcript p. r=
13)
Bonser met Keene who was working as a waitress at a restaurant in Manilla,
Utah and they became intimately involved from March 2003 through May
200.

--

)

Bonser would spend the night at Keene's trailer most of the nights when he
had gone fishing on Flaming Gorge, but only when Keene was also present.
(Tnmsmpl p 7" 1! "u I h
Keene testified that Bonser was a frequent overnight visitor in her residence
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located at #10 Scott's trailer Park, Manilla, Utah during the months of
March, April and May 2003. (Transcript p. 3-4)
k.

Keene also testified that Bonser left his boat and fishing clothes stored at
her home during those months (Transcript p. 4,1. 23-24, p. 5,1. 3) and that
he gave her a clothes dryer, a TV, a DVD player and a vacuum cleaner
which she has retained. (Transcript p. 5,1. 10-12)

1.

Keene admitted that Bonser did not receive his mail at her residence
(Transcript p. 28,11. 10-11), that he worked for BSI services, Mountain
View, Wyoming (Transcript p. 6,1. 3; R.O.A. 92), that he received no bills
at her home (Transcript p. 28,1. 19-21) and that he only gave her $90.00 for
food as a "one time deal" (Transcript p. 30,11. 4-5.)

7.

Following the close of evidence and the argument of counsel Judge Anderson
made his ruling which is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix "B".
SUMMARY O F THE A R G U M E N T

Bonser, who is a legal resident of the state of Wyoming, had an intimate relation
with Keene from late March 2003 through May 31, 2003. Keene is a legal resident of
Utah, residing in Manila, Utah. Although they disputed the frequency of such visits,
Bonser sometimes stayed overnight at Keene's house. Under the Cohabitant Abuse Act, a
Protective Order can be issued only against a cohabitant as defined in that act. In this
case, Bonser was a cohabitant only if he resided in the same residence with Keene. If

Bonser was not a resident there, the Cohabitant Abuse Act did not apply and Keene's
remedy was for equitable relief through restraining order or other remedy. A common
residence, however, may not be in two different states, or it is sliii.pl:> not the " 'sat ne
residence." The trial court, however, found that Keene had her residence in Manilla,
Utah. Then it interpreted the statute to allow Bonser to choose to not make Utah his
residence, yet still reside with Keene, who did reside in Utah.
1 he trial com t however, failed to make appi opriate facti lal findings to si lpport its
legal conclusion that Bonser had a common residence with Keene. Utah R. Civ. P. 52
requires specific findings of fact. The trial court's decision never stated the findings
necessary i mder R ule 52 While i in :k i lin ii ted cii ci m istances appellate coi irts i nay imply
findings of fact, this requires that there are not a matrix of alternative factual findings
available and clear evidence that the trial court actually considered and necessarily made
the necessary findings

1 1 lat is ii : t this case There were cilspi itecl facts, ai id se1 ' sral

possible factual determinations. Consequently, findings cannot be implied, and the
findings needed to support the conclusion that Bonser was a resident in Manila, Utah are

Moreover, the evidence was insufficient to support those necessary findings of
fact. Utah case law sets forth a variety of factors to determine residency and in a variety
of contexts

\:fit sr in larshaling all tl le evi dene 2 in si lppoi t to findings the ecu u 1: si 101 ild

have made, virtually none of it evidences the facts necessary to conclude Bonser resided

8

in the same residence with Keene in Manilla, Utah. That is perhaps why the trial court's
findings of fact were sparse or nonexistent.
Finally, the trial court erred when it concluded that Bonser had a residence in
Manila, Utah, which he shared with Keene. That legal conclusion was based on the trial
court's incorrect determination that the statutory definition of residence had to be "broad"
to "cover folks who are entitled to protective orders." Because that was its stated basis,
the trial court's logic was circular and result-oriented. The conclusion was further flawed
because the statute is not broad, but specific, and the trial court ignored or misinterpreted
Utah law delineating what is required to show residency.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Trial Court Failed to Make the Necessary Factual Findings to
Support its Legal Conclusion That Bonser Resided in the Same
Residence as Keener (and was, Therefore a Cohabitant Under the Act).
The Actual Findings are Inadequate.

The law in Utah has long been that"[i]t is necessary that the conclusions of law
find support in, and arise out of, the findings of fact." Needham v. First Nat. Bank, 85
P.2d 785 at 787, 96 Utah 432 (Utah 1938){citations omitted}; Utah R. Civ. P. 52. On the
issue of whether Bonser resided in the same residence with Keene and was therefore was
a cohabitant under the Act, the trial court announced its ruling without specific findings
of fact whatsoever. It ruled as follows:
The issue of jurisdiction that Mr. Mclntyre has raised deals with -1 think
the Court would interpret that as a broad definition to cover folks who are
9

entitled to protective orders that have resided or are residing in the same
residence. I interpret that as meaning not that Mr. Bonser chose to make
Utah his residence. For the purposes of a statute in the definition, I'm
going to find that we have jurisdiction. Mr. Bonser and Ms. Keene were
residing or had resided in the same residence, residence being her house
trailer with a bedroom and a bed. That's pretty clear I think under the
statute.
(Transcript pp. 90 -91.)
The trial court also made an oblique reference to Keene's lack of credibility,
stating"[i]'

•• believed1-

ri

^h'--

. . : ,^!- ^ * i

'• ^ * ]>-\*\u-

p. 92. This apparently refers to the court's decision regarding firearms, but the record is
not clear whether it reflect the court's opinion on her credibility in other areas. The trial
< •-

--

dings and gas i im \ iVdi imlfCafioit ol'\> hut might lia\ i hi ui in the

"mind of the court" when it concluded residency existed. See id, i\n. 90 -92.
That ruling is simply inadequate for its purposes.
Rule 52(a) requires that a trial court find facts specially in all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury. Such findings of fact must clearly indicate the "mind of the
court," and must resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the
conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon. Furthermore, failure of a trial
court to enter adequate findings requires the judgment to be vacated.
Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank 673 I " 2- 1 590 i t;1 601 (I It; ill 1/983). I Jere, h< >w e\ t *, the ; 1 ri; il
court did not address the issues of material fact on the residency issue. Its findings of fact
are simply insufficient to support its conclusion that the parties resided together in the
!-.. \. i\-<ul -ices.
Although, as noted below, Bonser believes the evidence Keene presented did not
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address the necessary indicia of residence, the trial court made no findings on the indicia
Keene did raise. For instance, although there was evidence on some matters, the trial
court did not make any finding that Bonser ever regularly stayed overnight with Keene,
nor did the trial court make a finding that Bonser left any of his clothing or other
possessions at Keene's residence when he was not there. Nor did it indicate any tie
between those facts and his residency status.
On other indicia, the trial court did not find that Bonser received any mail at
Keene's residence, worked out of there, voted there, had family there or otherwise had
any objective indicia of residence. It did however, implicitly find that it was somehow
not necessary for Mr. Bonser to give up Wyoming residence to reside with Ms. Keene at
her residence in Utah.
By deciding that it should broadly interpret the definition of "cohabitant'' "to cover
folks who are entitled to protective orders," and then leaping to the conclusion that
Bonser and Keene had resided together, the trial court used circular reasoning to
bootstrap itself into issuing a protective order. See transcript at p.90,1.23-24. Certainly if
the trial court had determined that it was necessary to protect Keene, there were many less
intrusive remedies available to Keene and Judge Anderson (e.g. restraining orders or
peace bonds). The trial court failed to set forth sufficient reasons for its decision so that it
could be reviewed on appeal.

11

Implied Findings are not Warranted.
Under certain circumstances an appellate court may imply findings when the
record shows the trial court necessarily made a finding that it failed to state. But those
I o impl> si ich missing f< - !; -igs of fact, "there ir: - ' .

circui nstances are lin lited

s

• \.

evidence that the court 'actually considered1 and 'necessarily' made its findings" Miller v.
Martineau & Co., C.P.A., 1999 UT App. 216 f 46, 983 P.2d 1107, 1116 - 1 1 1 7 (quoting Hall
v. Hall, 85b "

1U25 (Uta,: \ )p.l993). Missing findings of fad w ill iu 1 1 )e

implied "where there is a 'matrix of possible factual findings.'" Miller, 1999 UT App. 216
f 46 (quoting Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah App.1991)).
Here ili'iTi; wan jint

MIII.II

d itatiix of passible findings Ixwtu^c Keened c\ idenee

regarding indicia of residence was disputed. Much of Bonser's was not. The factual
disputes centered around how much time Bonser spent at Keene's trailer, what items he
kept there, and w 1: iatB« :v-.

. -..

- ^.uhiiiiLi.-Mv.. n,;

a iuu,

. ^ is

undisputed that Bonser never intended to make Manila, Utah or Keene's trailer his
residence. Transcript p. 57.
On tl lat first issue of tin le spent, K eei le testified :;;ai

!M\I-.:I

Ma\L-d ,ri : ,-

\:m,..

a regular basis - 6 to 7 nights per week, except when Bonser was working. Transcript p.
5. Judge Anderson had remarked, however, that on at least some issue, Keene's
testr

r\ ^ . , - . . .

..:-•,' -

;<>rr**\/•*

i.-r. ;e-* ?v.>nl"is.. : p i , ,

..-'C

schedule and his diary. His testimony showed that he was out on jobs for large blocks of
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time from late March though mid May of 2003. Under the circumstances it was
impossible that he stayed at the trailer for significant periods of time. He testified that
over a two month period, his stays at Keene9s trailer were basically weekends. See
Transcript p.p. 53-56. The longest he ever stayed there was four days, when he was sick.
Id. p. 56. Other witnesses testified that Bonser only stayed there a few times (Transcript
p. 42); that he lived with his parents in Mountain View, Wyoming {id. p. 50) and that
Bonser spent mostly weekends at Keene's trailer. Id.
Likewise, there was conflicting testimony regarding what things were kept by
Bonser at Keene's trailer. Keene testified that he kept all sorts of items there and that he
had his own drawer. Id. p. 5. Yet Bonser testified that he did not keep much, and that
what he did keep was in a travel bag or on a chair. Id. p. 56. On cross examination,
Keene had admitted that the clothing that was there was very limited: one or two
sweatshirts; a pair of shoes; one pair of socks; a tee shirt and a pair of shorts. Id. p. 21.
Likewise, she had admitted that Bonser did not receive mail or bills there. Id. p. 28.
Thus, just based on these issues there potentially different factual findings.
Accordingly, what was in the mind of the trial court cannot be implied. Notably Bonser
was very clear, and it was uncontroverted, that he never intended to give up his Wyoming
residency. The trial court seemed satisfied that he had not done so, but apparently did not
consider it relevant. (Transcript p. 90 -91)
II.

The Evidence at Trial was not Sufficient to Support the Findings of
Fact the Trial Court Should Have Made.
13

"[T]o obtain a protective order, [Keene] was required to show that she was a
cohabitant." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f24 52 P.3d 1158. Although there are several
alternative definitions, all but one were inapplicable: Bonser and Keen were never
n:.!ir; ••"

i
> -*-

i

-

'I

common - born or expected. Thus, the only definition of "cohabitant" to apply is "a
person who is 16 years or older who . . . resides or has resided in the same residence as
t

-

.•

•

.* :' •;; ^ -\vne

chose, it was her burden to establish, and the one the trial court "found".
Findings will be overturned if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or
the appellate court readies "a firm i omiclion (licit a mistake lias been made." f'tuMax
Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App.1997). Bonser is required to
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate why it is legally
insuffic •..

v.,i.^ however, the fin

:...':-.

• .,,,

here he must focus on findings the trial court should have addressed, but did not.
The legislature has statutorily defined the word "cohabitant" as it relates to the
Cohabitant Abuse Aci

•

^ode Ann. §30 6 1 (1998)

C :»"i l r ts are generall> i eqi lii ed

to apply the plain meaning of statutes as defined by the legislature. Here cohabitant is
defined in terms of residence - that is "has resided in the same residence."
\V hei i one foci ises on tl le phrase "residing in the same residence" the plain
meaning of the statute becomes clearer, as do the necessary factual inquiries. A resident
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is something more than a mere inhabitant. Mesa Development Co. v Sandy City Corp.,
948 P.2d 3665 369 (Utah App. 1997). In Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT
App 221, 51 P.3d 1288, this Court adopted the dictionary definition as helpful in
determining the meaning of the phrase "residing in," stating:
Webster's Third International Dictionary defines "reside" and "residing" as
"to dwell permanently or continuously," "have a settled abode for a time,"
and "have one's residence or domicile." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1931 (1986). In addition, Webster's defines "resident" as
"dwelling or having an abode for a continued length of time."
Travelers, 2002 UT App 221113, 51 P.3d 1288. The Court went on to note that:
[r]elevant factors include voting, owning property, paying taxes, having
family in the area, maintaining a mailing address, being born or raised in the
area, working or operating a business, and having children attend school in
the forum. In addition, one retains his residence or domicile until he
acquires a new one.
Travelers atfl4 {citations omitted}.
Utah Courts have noted that a resident is distinguished from a mere temporary or
transient visitor in the context of insurance policies. Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah 1982). Property ownership of itself does not make one
a resident. Mesa Development Co., Inc. v. Sandy City Corp., 948 P.2d 366 (Utah App.
1997). Notably voting is one of the indicia of residency. Simple abode in Utah does not
establish residency for voting. Indeed, statute sets forth numerous requirements under
which one could stay in Utah for even extended time periods and yet never be a resident.
Basically one must reside in Utah with the intention to continue permanent or indefinite
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residence. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2-105(2) (2002). Simple presence will not establish
residency in Utah. Id. § 105(4)(c). Even in the context of alimony termination, a
continuous stay of two months and ten days did not constitute "residency or cohabitation
- c\ en if inth nate relations are in < 'ol * > e :1 Knute son i > Knute son. 619 P 2d 1387 (I J tali
1980). In Knuteson, the Utah Supreme Court noted reliance on the dictionary definition
of "reside" which is "[t]o dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled
{•

•

M "" "' • :•'*. <: * . '--

l

'*

• Webster'<

v
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T

^
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Century Dictionary, 2nd Edition).
At trial, Keene's evidentiary focus was very limited. She presented no evidence

Nor did she present evidence about voting, owning property, taxes, having fami;> in the
area, maintaining a mailing address, operation of a business or employment, or Bonser5s
< .\\

.

..

•

.

.2.

She did, however, present evidence regarding what items Bonser kept at her trailer
and how often he stayed there. As noted above, there were significant disputes on some
oi liiC^e iiij-ie:

•«. .

' » n ^ i : >.

,

'. • ' . \
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. IA . \ui>

as

follows: Bonser met Keene sometime about February 2003. Towards the end of March
Bonser began staying overnight at Keene's about two to three times per week. Transcript

then some fishing and work clothes. Transcript p.p. I -5 By the end of April, more of
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Bonser's effects were there, including some tools, fishing gear, and personal effects such
as a toothbrush and shampoo. Id. Bonser stayed there overnight as much as six to seven
times a week "unless he was out of town with work." Id. She did not state how much he
was out of town and other evidence established that he was out of town a lot. Keene
knew that Bonser worked for BSI Services, although she did not know what that stood for
or exactly what he did. Transcript p.p. 6, 29. At some point Bonser had a key. In short,
she established that Bonser used her trailer to some extent and stayed there overnight.
But even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to her, significant questions
remain as to exactly how often Bonser stayed there. The evidence presented does not
establish that it was Bonser's residence or that he resided there.
Given that Keene had the burden of proof and was represented by private counsel
and knew that she must prove Bonser resided in the same residence with her, what is
remarkable is what was not presented. There was no evidence that Bonser contributed
anything to rent, utilities, repairs or maintenance of the residence. There was no evidence
that Bonser did any chores around Keene's home. There was no evidence that Bonser
ever went there unless Keene was either there or expected to be there shortly.
There was evidence that Bonser worked in and from an operations base in
Wyoming, received his mail in Wyoming, had been born and raised in Wyoming. He
maintained his Wyoming hunting and fishing privileges by maintaining a residence in
Wyoming. His family lived in Wyoming and they and his friends testified that Bonser
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lived with his father. Transcript p.p. 42, 47, 49 and 50. There was evidence that he had
no intention of giving up his Wyoming residence.
Under all the definitions and common meanings of the term "residence the trial
coi ii I: \ < - oi lid have had to also make findings regarding si ich things as i ntent, receipt of
mail or mailing address, length or duration of stay, frequency of stay, permanence of
abode, abandonment of his previous residence, voting, presence of family, work or
bi isiness, \ oting, paying taxes , etc

Ilie evidence presented how e\ er ga ve this trial c -o\ u I:

little evidence from which it could have pronounced factual findings on these issues that
would have supported concluding Bonser was a resident. To a large extent, the evidence
eonairiin,. Ilivse other i'.si'io. a!! mililiil • in (in IT.»I H-,inscr*^ residence heine Mimnl.iiii.
View, Wyoming and not Manila, Utah. His stays in Keene's trailer were relatively
limited. There was no evidence that he voted in Manila and the evidence presented would
have precli ided him c - snb sing a 1 < otei there had he tried. 1 1 : r cc

* '-'i-^vd a

vehicle in Utah as a resident. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-202(b)(i) (1994), In sum, the
evidence was insufficient to conclude that Keene's trailer was ever Bonser's residence.
Bonser5s in v olvemei it ^ \ ith J\ Is. Keene falls ii lore in the category c f his being a tiiin.sie.nt
or temporary visitor.
III.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That Bonser was a Cohabitant.

"Before a protective order may issi le, a, coi irt mi ist first :onch ide that the partie s to
the protective order are cohabitants." State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ^[17, 54 P.3d
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645, 649. As noted above, that is a legal determination that Bonser was a person who had
"resided in the same residence" with Keene. Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(2) (f) (Supp.
2003) (portions omitted). On that issue the court set forth its ruling as follows:
The issue of jurisdiction that Mr. Mclntyre has raised deals with -1 think
the Court would interpret that as a broad definition to cover folks who are
entitled to protective orders that have resided or are residing in the same
residence. I interpret that as meaning not that Mr. Bonser chose to make
Utah his residence. For purposes of a statute in the definition, I going to
find that we have jurisdiction. Mr. Bonser and Ms. Keene were residing in
or had resided in the same residence, residence being her house trailer with
a bedroom and a bed. That's pretty clear I think under the statute.
Transcript p.p. 90 -91. Nothing more in the trial court's ruling addresses the issue. See
id. p.p. 90-92. As noted, the ruling is circular and bootstraps itself to the conclusion going something like "if violence occurred, Keene needs a protective order and, therefore,
we broadly construe the statute so that Bonser is a cohabitant."
But the definition of cohabitant here is not broad. It is very specific, delineating
specific categories of people who are cohabitants and, accordingly, covered by the Act.
Those persons are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(2) (a) through (f). Although
other remedies may lie for persons not defined, the Cohabitant Abuse Act does not apply
to them.
Judge Anderson gave little indication why or how he found that Bonser resided in
Keene's residence. The only clue is that he found that Keene's residence consisted of a
house trailer with a bedroom and a bed. Because of the trial court's apparent focus on the
bedroom, it may be that Judge Anderson concluded the exercise of intimate relations,
19

which often relates to cohabitation, was a triggering component in the Cohabitant A b u s e
statute.
With all deference to Judge Anderson, the statute does not support that

issue here is not one which deals with parties w h o are or have had intimate relations.
Those were delineated in subsections (a) through (e), that is: spouses, living as i f spouses,
related b;> marriage, and childre n it: i, cc mmon

? > h sthei actual or expected [ Jtah Code

Ann. § 30-6-1(2) (a) through (e). The definition at issue here was specifically defined
only in terms of residency. When a term is statutorily defined, "we look to that definition
for gukLiiin; nliLii inlcrpivtinj; the slaluk lalhtr tlkin i\ 1 ni 1 Ill "nriliiLin anil accepted
meaning" of the term." Grynberg

v. Questar Pipeline

Co., 2 0 0 3 U T 8 U 30, 70 P . 3 d 1, 8

(citation omitted). Thus, while term "cohabitant" often carries connotations o f intimate
relat *.

-
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ii"n ^iivK p u r l i n -au;< s. a

residence without the necessity of proof of intimate relations, e.g. a renter in one's home,
a roommate, etc.
I\ lore o v en: , it i otl I zi contexts, tl ic \ \ oi d "cohabitatic n" has a long histoi y of
interpretation in Utah. Prior to statehood the word w a s the subject o f a great amount o f
juridical discourse as a result o f the passage o f the Edmunds Act. See U.S. v.

1

Cannon,!

U.S. v. Eldredge, 14 P. 42 (Utah Terr. 1887); U.S. v. Clark, 14 P. 288 (Utah Terr.
1 XX 71" f S i Smith, 14 P. 291 (Utah Terr. 1887); US. v. Peay, 14 P. 342 (Utah Terr. 1887); US
20

unlawful cohabitation where it was not possible to prove that the parties were engaging in
intimate relations. For well over a century, Utah Courts have often construed
cohabitation at common law as being independent of intimate relationships. And since
statehood the word has continued to evolve. "To some extent, the meaning of the term
[cohabitation] depends upon the context in which it is used." Haddow v. Haddow, 707
P.2d 669 at 671 (Utah 1985); Hill v. Hill 968 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1998).
It may be that the trial court misconstrued the meaning of "cohabitant" based on
misperceptions as to the common law, or how that term should be applied under the
Cohabitant Abuse Act. Given the language of the ruling, however, it is clear that the trial
court did not focus on the concept of a common residence dictated by the statute.
CONCLUSION

The trial court failed to make the findings of fact necessary to support its legal
conclusion that Appellant Ashley Bonser resided in the same residence with Appellee
Andrea Keene. Normally, this would necessitate a remand for further findings.
However, when one looks at the evidence that was presented, it was insufficient to
support findings that would support the conclusion that Bonser did reside with Keene in
the same residence. Finally, the trial court misconstrued the definition of cohabitant in
v. Kirkwood, 13 P. 234 (Utah Terr. 1887); U.S. v. Bassett913 P. 237 (Utah Terr. 1887); U.S. v.
Eldredge, 13 P. 673 (Utah Terr. 1887); U.S. v. Groesbeck, 11 P. 542 (Utah Terr. 1886); U.S. v.
White, 11 P. 570 (Utah Terr. 1886); US. v. Bromley, 11 P. 619 (Utah Terr. 1886); U.S. v. Snow, 9
P. 501 (Utah Terr. 1886); U.S. v. Simpson, 7 P. 257 (Utah Terr. 1885); U.S. v. Musser, 7 P. 389
(Utah Terr. 1885).
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this matter. Remand would be futile and the matter should be reversed.
DATED this 3 ^ day of March, 2004.
McINTYRE &(,<>! DLN I i

JAMES AvMcINTYRE
Attorney for jRespondent/Appella;
\\Offserve2\Files\Clients\Bonser, Ashley ads Aml;ej Is cone 4ppeal\AppelIant's Opening Brief wpd
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CERTIFICA1E OF SERVICE
I certify that on thtpij

day of March, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief to be mailed by first class mail to the following:
Randall Gaither
Attorney at Law
159 West 300 South Broadway, #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Exhibit A

Page 1
ritation/Title
JT Code § 30-6-1, Definitions.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
WESTS UTAH CODE
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 6. COHABITANT ABUSE ACT
Current through End of 2003 1st Sp. Sess.

I 30-6-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to cause a cohabitant physical harm or intentionally or
aiowingly placing a cohabitant in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm.
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or older who:
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party;
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party;
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party;
(d) has one or more children in common with the other party;
(e) is the biological parent of the other party's unborn child; or
(f) resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does not include:
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent to a minor; or
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive, step, or foster siblings who are under 18 years of age.
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk.
(5) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is defined in Section 77-36-1.
(6) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued without notice to the defendant in accordance with this chapter.
(7) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order issued by another state, territory, or possession of the United States,
ribal lands of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia which shall be given full faith and
;redit in Utah, if the protective order is similar to a protective order issued in compliance with Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse
\ct, or Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, and includes the following requirements:
(a) the requirements of due process were met by the issuing court, including subject matter and personal jurisdiction;
© 2003 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.

Page ;
JT Code § 30-6-1, D e f i n i t i o n s .
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice; and
(c) the respondent had an opporti mit; ' for a hearii ig regarding i. , . • ••,-. :\•, -UK\.
(8) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement agency" means any public agency having general police power and charged
with making arrests in connection with enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances of this state or any political subdivision.
*10320 (9) "Peace officer" means those persons specified in Title 53, Chapter 13, Peace Officer Classifications.
(10) "Protective order" means an order issued pursuant to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the
petitioner and respondent have been given notice in accordance with this chapter.

intended by Laws 1993, c. 137; Laws 1995, c. 300, § 2, eff July 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 244, § 2, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 303, § 1, eff May 5, 1997
Laws 1998, c. 282, § 12, eff May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 170, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 9, § 51, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 68, § 1, eff. May
>, 2003.

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAGGETT COUNTY
MANILA DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 034800003

ANDREA N.KEENE,
1

Petitioner,
v
ASHLEY J. BONSER,
Respondent.
HEARING ON PROTECTIVE ORDER SEPTEMBER 5, 2003
BEFORE
HONORABLE JOHN R ANDERSON

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
FILED
Certified Court Transcriber
Utah Court of Appeals 1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
JAN 2 8 2004
'
801-523-1186
Hdiiletie Stagg
Clerk of the Court

1S*>ViM&ft

NOV - 3 2003
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finds a protective orders but disorderly conduct, not related
to domestic violence.

If the Court would review that

particular portion of the code, if (inaudible) that that does

I

not trigger the prohibition

i

(inaudible), if the Court is

inclined to issue any sort of a protective order.
Equally, it is not appropriate to issue the
protective order because we don't think these people were co-

J
!

habitants.

M r . Bonser was a resident of Wyoming and has

constantly been a resident of Wyoming and all of his relatives, i
friends have testified that he's always resided in Wyoming and
that basically precludes him from having resided in the same
residence as Mr. Keene and that, in and of it itself, is

j

sufficient for the Court not to find him to be a co-habitant

•

and therefore not subject to the (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you.

Bear with me for a few

minutes and let me examine my notes and look at these exhibits ,
\

and I'll come back out and give you the ruling.

(Whereupon a recess was taken)
THE COURT: Thank you.

!

Please be seated.

First thing I guess I should address, again, this is '
Andrea Keene v. Ashley Bonser, protective order hearing.

The
i

issue of jurisdiction that Mr. Mclntyre has raised deals with - I
i

I think the Court would interpret that as a broad definition to
cover folks who are entitled to protective orders that have
resided or are residing in the same residence.

I interpret

:

I
90 '

that as meaning not that Mr. Bonser chose to make Utah his
residence.

For purposes of a statute in the definition, I'm

going to find that we have jurisdiction.

Mr. Bonser and Ms.

Keene were residing or had resided in the same residence,
residence being her house trailer with a bedroom 'and a bed.
That's pretty clear I think under the statute.
The second thing I need to address is whether there
has been a case justifying the issuance of a permanent order.
It seems to me that burden has been met by a preponderance of
the evidence.

From the testimony that was given by Ashley

Bonser, he was agitated, he was excited, he was mad, he broke
his fishing pole, he hit his truck and more importantly to me
he had many opportunities to leave.
the house to settle her down.
problem.

He kept going back into

That's the problem.

Why didn't he just leave?

She said/he said.

his hands may have slipped up to her neck.
did.

I find that they did.

That's the
He said

Well, they probably

The exhibit demonstrates that.

I'm going to make the order permanent.

So

And let me say this, I

have heard probably 200 or 300 of these cases and I've never
taken anybody's guns away from them in the order but I'm going
to do that in this case.

Mr. Bonser by his own testimony, in

an agitated state, said he threw rounds into that shotgun.
That's crazy.

And I think it warrants me taking his guns away

and the sheriff should be instructed to collect those guns and
hold them until further disposition in the other case at least.
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If we had believed her testimony, I probably wouldn't
have done that although it wouldn't make sense for him to come
in the house with a loaded rifle and badger his way in, but for
him to throw rounds in a shotgun in that state of mind they
were in is, in my mind, a very scary thing so that's my ruling
and those are my reasons and I have taken the liberty to fill
out the permanent protective order.
copies.

I'll have my bailiff make

Everybody can take their copy before they leave and

I'll be in recess.

I appreciate the way the case was tried.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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